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CRIMINAL LAW-REITERATED CONTEMPT OF CouRT-The defendant 
was found guilty of criminal contempt of court1 in a civil proceeding for 
giving "don't remember" answers,2 after having been granted immunity 
1 "A Court of record has power to punish for a criminal contempt, a person guilty 
of •.• contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness; or, after being sworn, 
to answer any legal and proper interrogatory." N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 750(5). This should 
not be confused with N.Y. PEN. LAw § 600, which, in similiar language, defines contempt 
of court as a misdemeanor and provides for a criminal prosecution for the misdemeanor 
of criminal contempt. The New York courts have held that the two statutes are wholly 
independent of each other and both remedies or either may be pursued. People ex rel. 
Sherwin v. Mead, 92 N.Y. 415, 420 (1883); In re Amato, 204 Misc. 454, 124 N.Y.S.2d 726 
(Sup. Ct. 1953). 
2 Although the defendant did not in form refuse to testify, the court felt justified 
in concluding that his "don't remember" answers were, in fact, a refusal to testify. 
People ex rel. Cirillo v. Warden, 11 N.Y.2d 51, 181 N.E.2d 424, 226 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1962). 
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from prosecution,3 to questions concerning his activities, asked during a 
grand jury investigation of an attempted homicide. For his refusal to 
testify, the defendant was given the maximum penalty provided for criminal 
contempt under the applicable statute.4 After paying the fine and serving 
the sentence, the defendant was brought before the same grand jury 
thirty-five days later and was asked the same questions. The defendant 
repeated the "don't remember" answers and was again fined and incar-
cerated. On appeal, held, affirmed, one judge dissenting. The defendant's 
refusal to answer at his second appearance before the grand jury constituted 
a separate and new act of contempt rather than a continuation of the 
previous refusal. Second Additional Grand Jury v. Cirillo, 12 N.Y.2d 206, 
188 N.E.2d 138,237 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1963). 
The power invoked by the court in the principal case to punish for 
contempt, although regulated by legislation, is inherent in the courts because 
it is necessary to the execution of the court's powers." A criminal contempt 
conviction is said to be punitive in nature and the punishment is for the 
purpose of vindicating the authority of the court.6 In this context criminal 
contempt is not a crime in the sense of being a misdemeanor or a felony;7 
consequently, the doctrine of double jeopardy is often said to have no 
application in the multiple or reiterated contempt situation.8 More fre-
quently, as in the principal case, the courts avoid the double jeopardy issue 
by holding that each reiterated contempt is a separate offense; thus the 
accused is not being punished twice for the same act.9 Behind this reasoning 
lies the policy that each individual must testify if necessary,10 and that 
society has the right to every man's evidence.11 The reiterated contempt 
3 The immunity granted by the state protects the witness against prosecution under 
its laws for wrongdoing the witness himself might disclose during the investigation. 
N.Y. PEN. LAw § 2447. However, the immunity extended by the state does not protect him 
against prosecution by the federal government or by other states. Mills v. Louisiana, 
360 U.S. 230 (1959); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); People v. Riela, 7 N.Y.2d 
571, 166 N.E.2d 840, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1960). 
4 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 751, provides for punishment for contempt of court, under 
§ 750, by fine not exceeding $250, or by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days, or both. 
5 See Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888). 
6 Gompers v. Bucks Stove 8e Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911). If the punishment 
is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant the contempt is civil. Ibid. However, 
the distinction between criminal contempt and civil contempt is not at all clear. For 
a discussion of that distinction, see generally Goldfarb, The Varieties of the Contempt 
Power, 13 SYRACUSE L. REv. 44 (1961). 
7 See note 1 supra. 
8 "In fact, it has been repeatedly held that one who has been found guilty of 
contempt under the provisions of the Judiciary Law may not thereafter invoke the 
defense of former jeopardy because the former is not a crime." People ex rel. Amarante 
v. McDonnell, 100 N.Y.S.2d 463, 469 (Sup. Ct. 1950); cf. State v. Kasherman, 177 Minn. 
200, 224 N.W. 838, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 602 (1929). 
9 Ex parte Stice, 70 Cal. 51, 11 Pac. 459 (1886); In re Ward, 295 Mich. 742, 295 N.W. 
483 (1940); cf. Williams v. Davis, 27 Cal. 2d 746, 751, 167 P.2d 189, 192 (1946). 
10 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919). 
11 See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961). This is, of course, 
subject to the witness' constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and the various 
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cases generally fall into one of three categories: refusals concerning (1) 
separate subjects on the same day, (2) the same subject on the same day, 
or (3) the same subject on different days. In the first category each refusal 
constitutes a separate contempt.12 However, in the second category the 
initial refusal marks the contumacious act and the prosecution cannot mul-
tiply contempt convictions by repeatedly asking questions related to that 
subject.18 When the courts are presented with cases in the third category, 
as in the principal case, they normally hold that each refusal constitutes 
a separate contempt.14 Illustrative of a single case presenting both of the 
latter two categories is United States v. Costello.HS The defendant had been 
brought before a congressional investigating committee on two succeeding 
days, and on both days had repeatedly refused to give any testimony what-
ever, claiming that he was suffering from acute laryngitis. He was convicted 
for multiple contempts. When an appeal was brought to contest the validity 
of those convictions, the counts relating to the defendant's repeated refusal 
to testify on a particular day were reduced to one count.16 However, the 
court affirmed the two counts which were based on the initial refusal to 
testify on each day, without discussion of the issue of whether the mere fact 
that the refusals occurred on different days justified making the refusal on 
the second day a separate contempt. Neither did the court discuss the 
possibilities of oppression that would arise if a witness were returned for 
questioning day after day. 
The principal case dealt directly with the problem only tacitly recog-
nized in Costello. While the decision in the principal case was amply 
supported by authority,17 at least two grounds exist on which the validity 
immunity provisions contained in state and federal statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. PEN. LAw 
§ 2447. 
12 Only one case was found in this category. A witness, without claiming the privilege 
of immunity, refused to testify or refused to remember, during a single day, who were 
the participants with him in five separate telephone conversations, and he was convicted 
of five separate contempts. People v. Saperstein, 2 N.Y.2d 210, 140 N.E.2d 252, 159 
N.Y.S.2d 160, cert. denied, 353 U.S. 946 (1957). 
18 A witness refused to answer seventeen questions relating to an alleged crime 
syndicate meeting, and he was held to have "carved out" an area of refusal. People v. 
Riela, 7 N.Y.2d 571, 166 N.E.2d 840, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1960); accord, Yates v. United 
States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957); United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 1953); 
United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952); 
United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F. Supp. 991, 992 (D. Hawaii 1950). But see Lawson v. 
United States, 176 F.2d 49, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1949). In People v. Riela, supra, the court 
distinguished People v. Saperstein, supra note 12, on the ground that the defendant 
in the case did not "carve out an area of refusal." If a witness were not allowed to 
"carve out" a subject about which he will not testify there would be a premium on 
completely refusing to testify, since that is treated as only one contempt. See 20 GA. B.J. 
413 (1958). 
14 See Ex parte Stice, 70 Cal. 51, 11 Pac. 459 (1886); In re Ward, 295 Mich. 742, 295 
N.W. 483 (1940); State v. Kasherman, 177 Minn. 200, 224 N.W. 838, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 
602 (1929). 
llS 198 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952). 
10 Id. at 204. 
17 See cases cited note 14 supra. 
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of its reasoning can be questioned. The first is that the defendant was 
merely repeating his first refusal and thus, for the same reason that repeated 
refusals within a given day are treated as only one contempt, he was likewise 
guilty of only one contempt. Admittedly, a witness has a duty to testify, but 
does the passing of a day, as in Costello, or a month, as in the principal 
case, enlarge the duty? If the contempt is complete when the witness refuses 
to give any testimony on one particular day, why is it not then complete 
with respect to the whole investigation? Conceivably, the only respite for 
such a witness would depend upon the limited stamina of the prosecution. 
The situation is analogous to the case of a person who commits two assaults, 
each on the same provocation, yet each on different days. Clearly there are 
two punishable offenses; yet repeated blows during any one assault render 
the attacker liable for only one conviction. However, the purpose of an 
assault conviction is to deter the defendant from committing the act again, 
while the purpose of the contempt conviction is to induce the witness to 
testify.18 Thus, whether the refusals constitute one or two offenses might 
depend upon whether the repeated questions are part of a valid attempt 
to obtain evidence or are for the purpose of additionally punishing the 
witness for his contumacy regardless of the benefit that might be obtained 
from his testimony. In the latter case, especially if the need for the testimony 
of the witness has diminished, the second conviction would seem to be more 
for the purpose of harassment, and the court should consider the two refusals 
as only one offense. 
The second major objection to the result in the principal case is that, 
even if the distinction between refusals to answer on a single day and 
refusals on different days when the questions relate to the same subject is 
justifiable, the policy which favors valid efforts to obtain testimony should 
be limited by the danger of punishing a witness who is honestly unable to 
answer. In the principal case, the court hinted at this restriction by noting 
that at some point repeated convictions based on the same refusal could 
"be so numerous or onerous as to deny due process to the person ques-
tioned."19 While this expressed fear runs counter to the assumption that 
these are "separate and distinct" offenses,20 the argument does recognize 
the possibility that courts may not always be accurate in their determination 
of whether repeated questioning is justified as a valid attempt to obtain 
evidence, or is for the purpose of harassment. Although in the principal 
case the court was perhaps justified in treating the defendant's lapse of 
18 State v. Kasherman, 177 Minn. 200, 224 N.W. 838, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 602 (1929). 
10 Principal case at 2ll, 188 N.E.2d at 141, 237 N.Y.S.2d at '713; see People ex rel. 
Valenti v. McCloskey, 6 N.Y.2d 390, 404-05, 160 N.E.2d 647, 655, 189 N.Y.S.2d 898, 909 
(1959), 28 FORDHAM L. REv. 540; cf. Ex parte Stice, 70 Cal. 51, II Pac. 459 (1886). 
20 There is no concern about denial of due process to the two-time assaulter, and 
conceivably the court would have reached the same result if the convictions had been 
for the misdemeanor of criminal contempt. See note I supra. Compare People ex rel. 
Amarante v. McDonnell, 100 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (criminal contempt), with 
People v. Amarante, 100 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (misdemeanor of criminal contempt). 
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memory as an obvious unprivileged or recalcitrant refusal to testify, until 
the due process limitation is more adequately defined the danger exists 
that contempt proceedings may be used to exact testimony which the court 
deems satisfactory. AF, the dissenting judge pointed out, if the power re-
peatedly to incarcerate such a defendant "is upheld in one case, it can be 
abused in other cases."21 
The legal machinery apparently exists by which a reluctant witness can 
be punished indefinitely. AF, a practical matter, however, when contempt 
convictions are multiplied during a single proceeding the sentences usually 
run concurrently.22 Nevertheless, the courts should seriously consider the 
validity of the distinction between refusals occurring on the same day and 
refusals occurring on different days, since the metaphysical "separateness" 
of the offenses due to the mere passing of a day seems to cloud the real 
policy issues involved. In the principal case the court suggested that con-
tempt adjudications based on the same refusal could result at some point 
in a denial of due process. The court did not enunciate any criteria to help 
decide when that point would be reached. In view of the competing policy 
considerations between the right to obtain testimony and the possibilities 
of vindictive oppression that may arise from the exercise of that right, it 
would seem that due process is denied when the repeated questions are 
principally for the purpose of harassing a witness. In the principal case no 
mention was made of the relevancy of the evidence the witness might have 
provided. Presumably the grand jury still needed the information the de-
fendant supposedly possessed to complete its investigation. In order to 
balance society's rights against the rights of the individual, these factors 
should have been considered. 
Robert C. Bonges 
21 Principal case at 211, 188 N.E.2d at 141, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 713. 
22 See, e.g., Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
